We show that the great baseball players that started their careers before 1950 are overrepresented among rankings of baseball's all time greatest players.
Introduction
It is easy to be blown away by the accomplishments of great old time baseball players when you look at their raw or advanced baseball statistics. These players produced mind-boggling numbers. For example, see Babe Ruth's batting average and pitching numbers, Honus Wagner's 1900 season, Ty Cobb's 1911 season, Walter Johnson's 1913 season, Tris Speaker's 1916 season, Rogers Hornsby's 1925 season, Lou Gehrig's 1931 season, and many others. The statistical feats achieved by these players (and others) far surpass what the statistics that recent and current players produce. It seems, at first glance, that players from the old eras were vastly superior to the players in more modern eras. But, is this true? Were the old timers players actually better? In this paper, we investigate whether baseball players from earlier eras of professional baseball are overrepresented among the game's all-time greatest players according to popular opinion, performance metrics, and expert opinion. We define baseball players from earlier eras to be those that started their MLB careers in the 1950 season or before. We chose this year is chosen because it coincides with the decennial US Census and is close to 1947, the year in which baseball became integrated.
In this paper we do not compare baseball players via their statistical accomplishments. Such measures exhibit era biases that are confounded with actual performance. Consider the single season homerun record as an example. Before Babe Ruth, the single season homerun record was 27 by Ned Williams in 1884 (Reichler, 1985) . Babe Ruth broke this record in 1919 when he hit 29 homeruns. He subsequently destroyed his own record in the following 1920 season when he hit 54 homeruns. The runner up in 1920 finished the season with a grand total of 15 homeruns. At this point in time homerun hitting was not an integral part of a batter's approach (Baseball-Reference, 2018 ). This has changed. Now, we often see multiple batters reach at least 30-40 homeruns within one season and a 50 homerun season is not a rare occurrence (Baseball-Reference, 2018; Fangraphs, 2018) . In the 1920s, Babe Ruth stood head and shoulders above his peers due to a combination of his innate talent and circumstance. His approach was quickly emulated and became widely adopted (Baseball-Reference, 2018) . However, Ruth's accomplishments as a homerun hitter would not stand out if he played today and put up similar homerun totals. The example of homeruns hit by Babe Ruth and the impact they had relative to his peers represents a case where adjustment towards a peer-derived baseline fails across eras. No one reasonably expects 1920 Babe Ruth to hit more than three times the amount of homeruns hit by the second best homerun hitter if the 1920 version of Babe Ruth played today. This is far from an isolated case.
There are several statistical approaches used to compare baseball players across eras. Examples include wins above replacement as calculated by baseball reference (bWAR) (Baseball-Reference, 2018), wins above replacement as calculated by fangraphs (fWAR) (Fangraphs, 2018) , OPS+ (Baseball-Reference, 2018; Fangraphs, 2018) , ERA+ (Baseball-Reference, 2018; Fangraphs, 2018) , era-adjusted detrending (Petersen et al., 2011) , computing normal scores (Albert, 2002) , and era bridging (Berry et al., 1999) . A number of these are touted to be season adjusted and the remainder are widely understood to have the same effect. In one way or another all of these statistical approaches compare the accomplishments of players within one season to a baseline that is computed from statistical data within that same season. This method of player comparison ignores talent discrepancies that exist across seasons as noted by Gould (1996) ; Schmidt and Berri (2005) . Currently, there is no definitive quantitative or qualitative basis for comparing these baselines, which are used to form intra-season player comparisons, across seasons. These methods therefore fail to properly compare players across eras of baseball despite the claim that they are season adjusted.
Worse still is that these approaches exhibit a favorable bias towards baseball players who played in earlier seasons (Schmidt and Berri, 2005; Schoenfield, 2012 , reference to Bill James writing). We explore this bias from two separate theoretical perspectives underlying how baseball players from different eras would actually compete against each other. The first perspective is that players would teleport across eras to compete against each other. From this perspective, the players from earlier eras are at a competitive disadvantage because, on average, baseball players have gotten better as time has progressed (Gould, 1996; Schmidt and Berri, 2005) . Specifically, fastball velocity, pitch repertoire, training methods, and management strategies have all improved on average (Lewis, 2004; Keh, 2013; Thorn, 2014; Doran, 2015; Arthur, 2016; Castrovince, 2016) . We do not find the teleportation perspective to be of much interest for these reasons. The second perspective is that a player from one era could adapt naturally to the game conditions of another era if they grew up in that time. This line of thinking is challenging to current statistical methodology because adjustment to a peer-derived baseline no longer makes sense.
Even in light of these challenges with the second perspective, we find that the players from earlier eras are overrepresented among baseball's all time greats. We justify our findings through the consideration of population dynamics which have changed drastically over time (Gould, 1996) .
Data
The eligible MLB population is not well-defined. As a proxy, we can say that the eligible MLB population is the decennial count of males aged 20-29. This information is readily obtainable and does not explicitly double count individuals over the course of its collection. The MLB eligible population is displayed in Table  1 . The cumulative proportion means that at each era, the population of the previous eras is also included. As an example of how to interpret this dataset, consider the year 1950. There were 10.3 million males aged 20-29. The proportion of the eligible MLB population that existed at or before 1950 is 0.179.
We now explain the specifics of MLB eligible population data recorded in Table 1 . The MLB started in 1876 so our data collection begins with the 1880 Census. Baseball was finally integrated in 1947. As a result, African American and Hispanic demographic data is added to our dataset starting in 1960. The year 1960 is chosen because the integration of the MLB was slow (Armour, 2016) . We obtain this demographic data for the United States eligible MLB population from the US Census from 1880 -1950 (Cenus, 2018 . From 1960-2010, we use the United Nations Census (United Nations, 2011) for the United States eligible MLB population. The latter census is also used to estimate the population in the global talent pool from which the MLB draws.
African American and Hispanic citizens were not the only groups discriminated against by pre-(and post-) integration baseball. Players from Central and South American countries and the Caribbean islands were also discriminated against. Citizens from those countries are added to the eligible MLB player pool in 1960. The population data for these countries are obtained from the United Nations (2011). The countries included in our dataset are Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Cuba, Panama, Puerto Rico, Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Honduras, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Peru, Columbia, Nicaragua, and the United States Virgin Islands. In the 2000s, the MLB and minors saw an influx of Asian baseball players from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The populations from these countries are added to the eligible MLB player talent pool for those years. We obtain the Japanese, South Korean, and Philippines census data from the United Nations (2011). The census data from Taiwan is estimated from the CIA World Factbook (CIA World Factbook, 2018), the same age stratification was not obtainable so we use the population of males ages 0-14 for the 2010 Taiwanese MLB eligible population and males ages 15-24 for the 2000 Taiwanese MLB eligible population. In 2010, the MLB established a national training center in Brazil (Loré, 2017), so we have included the age 20-24 Brazilian male population obtained from United Nations (2011) into our MLB eligible population. The United Nations Census does not have information after 2010. We therefore estimate that the 2015 MLB eligible population is half of the 2010 MLB eligible population. We expect that this underestimates the actual 2015 MLB eligible population because we have observed a constant increase in the overall MLB eligible population as time increases. 
The Greats
At a quick glance of this population dataset, one can see how small the proportion of the pre-1950 eligible MLB population actually was. To determine which players are the all-time greatest players, we consult four lists which reflect popular opinion, performance metrics, and expert opinion that purport to determine the greatest players. The first list is compiled by Ranker (2018) , which is constructed entirely from popular opinion as determined by up and down votes. The second and third lists rank players by highest career WAR as calculated by Baseball-Reference (2018) and Fangraphs (2018) , respectively. The fourth list is a ranking from ESPN (ESPN, 2018) and is based on expert opinion (ESPN, 2015; Szymborski, 2015) .
The rankings for all four lists are given in Table 2 . As an example of the information contained in Table 2 consider the greatest players of all time according to ESPN displayed in the fourth column. We see that 5 players that started their careers before 1950 are in the top 10 all time and 11 players that started their careers before 1950 are in the top 25 all time. When the eligible MLB population is considered, it appears that the players from the earlier eras are overrepresented in this particular list. All of the lists that we consider exhibit this same bias towards the older players. In the next Section we provide statistical evidence supporting this position. 
Statistical Evidence
We now provide evidence that there are too many players that started their careers before 1950 included in top 10 and top 25 lists displayed in Table 2 . We require two assumptions for the validity of our calculations which we will explore in detail in the next Sections. These assumptions are:
• First, we assume that innate talent is uniformly distributed over the eligible MLB population over the different eras.
• Second, we assume that the outside competition to the MLB available by other sports leagues after 1950 is offset by the increased salary incentives received by MLB players after 1950.
With these assumptions in mind we calculate the probability that at least x people from each top 10 and top 25 list in Table 2 started their career before 1950 using the proportion depicted in Table 1 . Consider the bWAR list for example. According to bWAR, we see that 6 of the top 10 players started their career before 1950. From Table 1 we see that the proportion of the MLB eligible population that played at or before 1950 was approximately 0.179. We then calculate the probability that one would expect to observe 6 or more individuals in a top 10 list from that time period where the chance of observing each individual is about 0.179. We calculate this probability using the Binomial distribution, details of this calculation are provided in Appendix A. We perform the same type of extreme event calculation for each top 10 and top 25 list depicted in Table 2 . The results are provided in Table 3 .
Ranker
bWAR fWAR ESPN probability of extreme event in top 10 list 0.00043 0.0036 0.00043 0.021 probability of extreme event in top 25 list 0.0000034 0.0000034 0.000118 0.00229 chance of extreme event in top 10 list 1 in 2323 1 in 277 1 in 2323 1 in 47 chance of extreme event in top 25 list 1 in 298747 1 in 298747 1 in 8474 1 in 436 Table 3 : The probability and chance (1 in 1/probability) of each extreme event calculation corresponding to the four lists in Table 2 .
As an example of how to interpret the results of Table 3 , continue with bWAR's top 10 list. Table 3 shows that the probability of observing 6 or more players that started their career at or before 1950 of the top 10 all time players, based on population dynamics, is about 0.0036 (a chance of 1 in 277). The same interpretation applies to the other cells of Table 3 . The results provided in Table 3 present overwhelming evidence that players who started their careers before 1950 are overrepresented in top 10 and top 25 lists from the perspectives of fans, analytic assessment of performance, and experts' rankings. These findings are a testament to 1) how sparse the MLB eligible population was at and before 1950 relative to the MLB eligible population after 1950 and 2) how incorporating relevant population dynamics leads to completely different conclusions.
Assumptions
The probabilities and chances displayed in Table 3 are valid under the two assumptions given in the previous Section. In the first of these assumptions we specify that innate talent is evenly dispersed across eras. We do not fully believe that this assumption holds because the distribution of innate talent has improved over time as the eligible MLB population has expanded (Gould, 1996; Schmidt and Berri, 2005; Kahrl, 2016) . This suggests that the probabilities displayed in Table 3 are conservative. If we had refined data on the talent of those that strived to play professional baseball then the calculations in Table 3 would be even more extreme.
The second assumption states that the pool of talent available in the MLB has not been diminished by other sports leagues because of increased salary incentives to play baseball. We note that the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Football League (NFL) started in 1946 and 1920 respectively (Koppelt, 2007; NFL, 2017) with both sports greatly rising in popularity since the inception of their respective professional leagues. That being said, the increases in MLB player salaries have been substantial (Badenhausen, 2016; Haupert, 2016; Shaikin, 2016; Radcliffe, 2018) . As examples, the minimum MLB salary in 1967 was $6,000 which is about $45,000 in 2018 dollars (Shaikin, 2016) and the highest salary right before baseball was integrated in 1947 was $70,000 which is about $800,000 in 2018 dollars (Haupert, 2016) . In 2015, the minimum and average MLB salaries are $507,000 and $3,952,252, respectively, which are about $530,000 and $4,150,000, respectively, in 2018 dollars (Badenhausen, 2016) . The minimum MLB salary in 1967 was below the median US household income of $7,200 (Cenus, 1967) while the minimum MLB salary in 2015 places earners around the top 1% of US household income (IRS, 2018, data from 2014). The average MLB salary in 1920 was $5,000 per year (Radcliffe, 2018) which placed earners of this income in only about the top 35% of personal income (IRS, 1920) . Today, the average salary places earners well above the threshold of the top 1% of earners (Radcliffe, 2018) . In summary, baseball players made far less than they do today relative to the general US population. Furthermore, it is unclear that one could consider playing professional baseball to be a lucrative career in the older eras.
These strikingly different salary figures offer evidence that while other professional leagues may have drawn from the eligible MLB talent pool, salary incentives have led to an increase in the overall quality of MLB players. This suggests that our second assumption is conservative, again, if we had refined data on the eligible MLB population then the calculations in Table 3 would be even more extreme. However, we are not convinced that this is the case with any certainty, it may be that our second assumption suffers some modest violations.
To account for this possibility we consider a sensitivity analysis applied to the findings in Table 3 . For this sensitivity analysis we weight the decennial populations displayed in Table 1 to reflect the overall interest that the US population has had in the game of baseball over time. The four specific weighting schemes, denoted by w1, w2, w3, and w4, and their full descriptions are given in Appendix B. We briefly describe these weighting schemes. The first and second weighting schemes weigh populations with respect to overall interest in baseball. No information is given for pre-1940 baseball. As a result of this we weigh years before 1940 with more weight than years after 1940 and w2 places more weight on pre-1940 populations than w1. The third weighting scheme weighs populations based on favorite sport information. No information is given for pre-1940 baseball. As a result of this we give the highest weight observed at or after 1940 for all pre-1940 years. The fourth weighting scheme is an average of w2 and w3. All of these weighting schemes suggest that the eligible MLB population was more interested in reaching the MLB in earlier eras than in modern eras.
The results of weighting populations and then recalculating the probabilities and chances displayed in Table 3 are displayed in Table 4 . The conclusions from weighting populations with respect to w1 and w2 in Table 4 are consistent with those in Table 3 . It is very unlikely that such a sparsely populated time period could have produced so many historically great baseball players. The third weighting scheme presents some conflicting conclusions. When weighting populations with respect to w3 we see that popular opinion, bWAR, and fWAR overrepresent players who started their careers before 1950. However the same is not so for the ESPN lists, the probabilities of observing 5 or more players who started their careers before 1950 in a top 10 list (0.233) and the probability of observing 11 or more players who started their careers before 1950 in a top 25 list (0.207) are not that extreme. This gives skeptics to our approach some evidence in their favor. We will return to this finding later. The conclusions from weighting populations with respect to w4 is largely in alignment with those of the original data, with a possible exception being the conclusion drawn from ESPN's top 10 list. The overall finding of this sensitivity analysis is that weighting populations with respect to fan interest in baseball does not alter the overall conclusion of the original analysis. It is very Table 2 after the eligible MLB population in Table 1 is weighted according to four weighting schemes that are described in Appendix B.
unlikely that such a sparsely populated time period could have produced so many historically great baseball players.
Critique of additional comparison methods
In the previous Sections we observe that popular opinion (i.e., nostalgia) and performance metrics are in conflict with the population dynamics that underlie the distribution of the eligible MLB talent pool. We now critique additional methods that compare players across eras.
Critique of versus your peers methods
There are several methods which are used to compare players across eras that do so by computing a baseline achievement threshold within one season and then compare players to that baseline. These methods then rank players by how far they stood above their peers, the greatest players were better than their peers by the largest amount. As noted in the Introduction, examples include wins above replacement as calculated by baseball reference (bWAR) (Baseball-Reference, 2018), wins above replacement as calculated by fangraphs (fWAR) (Fangraphs, 2018) , OPS+ (Baseball-Reference, 2018; Fangraphs, 2018), ERA+ (Baseball-Reference, 2018; Fangraphs, 2018) , and computing normal scores (Albert, 2002) . This manner of player comparison is purely statistical and it ignores talent discrepancies that exist across seasons. We have shown that this is a fundamentally flawed methodological approach that can exhibit major biases in player comparisons as evidenced by career bWAR and fWAR.
Critique of detrending
In this Section we describe and critique the methodology of Petersen et al. (2011) in the context of comparing players across eras. We will refer to their paper as PPS due to repeated mentions. As described in PPS, they detrend player statistics by normalizing achievements to seasonal averages, which they claim accounts for changes in relative player ability resulting from both exogenous and endogenous factors, such as talent dilution from expansion, equipment and training improvements, as well as performance enhancing drug usage. As an argument in favor of players from earlier time periods, talent dilution from expansion is terribly misunderstood by PPS. If anything the talent pool was more diluted in the earlier eras of baseball because of a small relative eligible population size and the exclusion of entire populations of people on racial grounds. See Table 5 for the specifics. As an argument in favor of old time players, equipment and training improvements is not without fault because the same improvements are available to every competitor as well. PPS also fails to account for the effect of modern day filming as a way to gain insight on opponents' strengths and weakness in their training improvements assumption. They also fail to account for increases in salary compensation enjoyed by MLB players in more modern eras. Table 5 : Relative talent dilution when considering the eligible MLB population sizes at select time periods. Eligible population totals are in millions in column 2 and are in thousands in column 5.
The principle assumptions about baseball used as justification for PPS detrending are questionable at best. The mathematics of PPS detrending are also questionable in the context of comparing baseball players across eras. We now describe the mathematical formulation of the PPS detrending method. They first calculates the prowess P i (t) of an individual player i as
where x i (t) is an individual's total number of successes out of his/her total number of opportunities y i (t) in a given year t. To compute the league-wide average prowess, PPS then computes the weighted average for season t over all players
where
.
(
The index i runs over all players with at least y ′ opportunities during year t, and i y i is the total number of opportunities of all N (t) players during year t. A cutoff y ′ = 100 is employed to eliminate statistical fluctuations that arise from players with very short seasons. The PPS detrended metric for the accomplishment of player i in year t is then given as,
where P is the average of P (t) over the entire period,
The PPS detrended metric x D i (t) has its merits. It does adjust individual prowess towards the historical average prowess. It is also dimensionless in a physical sense with respect to the measured accomplishment. However, this metric is self-fulfilling; it is specifically constructed in alignment with the opinion that prowesses P (t) are simple deviations about P that are best addressed by shrinking era effects towards P . Furthermore, PPS states that prowess is a nonstationary time series which implies that the distribution of P can differ wildly when computed across different time windows.
We see PPS detrending as an inflationary metric of relative prowesses and not a era adjustment. We agree with Petersen when he says, "detrending corresponds to removing the inflationary factor, so we could compare two items like the cost of a candy bar in 1920 to the cost of a candy bar in 2000. In this case, we compare Babe Ruth's home runs-the ability of someone to get a home run then versus now-and you see Babe Ruth actually hit a lot of home runs on this relative basis," (Johnson, 2011) . However, having higher prowess relative to your peers, hitting more runs in this case, is not indicative of a player's prowess with respect to peers from fundamentally different eras. Additionally, failing to account for the fact that baseball was segregated before 1947 does not make the statistics fairer despite the claim that PPS detrending is a way to do as such (Johnson, 2011). 6.3 Critique of era bridging Berry et al. (1999) claim that their era bridging technique accounts for talent discrepancies across eras. However, they do not explicitly parameterize this in their hierarchical models. They also conclude that "globalization has been less pronounced in the MLB (relative to other sports), where players are drawn mainly from the United States and other countries in the Americas. Baseball has remained fairly stable within the United States, where it has been an important part of the culture for more than a century," (Berry et al., 1999) . This rationale ignores the segration of baseball before 1947, increases in the eligible MLB population relative to available roster spots, and increases in the average overall talent of the eligible MLB population.
Critique of our testing procedure
Our testing procedure is valid under two assumptions made in Section 4. A sensitivity analysis is given in Section 5 that considers how our findings change under violations of our assumptions. The results of the sensitivity analysis are largely consistent with our original analysis, with an exception being when we weigh populations with respect to a weighting scheme which states that the eligible MLB population were those who listed baseball as their favorite sport.
Comparison of critiques
Our methodology holds up well when we weight our original data in ways that reflect relative disbelief in our assumptions. Moreover, we expect that the conclusions drawn from weighting with respect to our third weighting scheme are extremely unlikely. To see this we investigate talent dilution with respect to the four weighted populations as depicted in Table 6 . From the w3 column of diluted at and before 1900. If that were truly the case then we would expect less variability and outliers in achievements (Gould, 1996) . The Baseball-Reference (2018) leader boards for these years indicate the exact opposite (see season batting average leaders (Baseball-Reference, 2018)) and this suggests that the talent pool in the MLB was diluted during that time period. PPS does not offer any insight on how their method fairs when their underlying assumptions are called into question. As argued in Section 6.1, methodology which compares players across eras by examining who stood the farthest from their peers is fundamentally flawed. Era bridging offers a step in the right direction but the methodology does not explicitly account for a changing talent pool. This is best exemplified by Berry et al. (1999, Table 9 ) in which they find that 6 of the 10 best hitters for average started their career before 1950 (chance of 1 in 277 in our Table 3 ) and 10 of the 25 best hitters for average started their career before 1950 (chance not computed in our Table 3 , but the same methodology yields a chance of 1 in 123).
Discussion
The MLB players from the old eras of baseball receive significant attention and praise as a result of their statistical achievements and their mythical lore. We argue that these players are collectively overrepresented in rankings of the greatest players in the history of the MLB. Our statistical methodology provides overwhelming evidence in favor of this argument. We conclude that the superior statistical accomplishments achieved by players that started their careers before 1950 are a reflection of our inability to properly compare talent across eras. It is highly unlikely that athletes from such a scarcely populated era of available baseball talent could represent top 10 and top 25 lists so abundantly.
Appendix A
We revisit the calculation discussed in the Statistical Evidence section. The chance that an eligible MLB player whose career was largely before 1950 appears in the top 10 occurs with probability p = 0.179 (up to three significant figures). We use the binomial distribution to calculate the probability of at least 6 eligible MLB players whose career started before 1950 appear in the top 10. More formally, we are interested in calculating P (X ≥ 6) where X is the number of players whose careers started before 1950 appearing in the top 10. So we have P (X ≥ 6) = P (X = 6) + · · · + P (X = 10).
The binomial distribution is used to calculate P (X = 6), . . ., P (X = 10) where P (X = x) = 10
x p x (1 − p) 10−x for x = 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. For example, when x = 6 we have P (X = 6) = 10 6 p 6 (1 − p) 4 .
Specifying x = 6 is equivalent to 6 eligible MLB players whose careers started before 1950 appearing in the top 10. We do not care about the order that players appear in the top 10. The number 10 6 corrects for this. The number 10 6 is the number of possible orderings of 6 "successes" and 4 "failures" that can occur. In our context a success is a MLB player whose career began before 1950 and a failure is an MLB player whose career began after 1950. Any particular ordering of the top 10 with 6 MLB players whose careers started before 1950 appearing in the list occurs with probability p 6 (1 − p) 4 . Therefore the probability that 6 MLB players who started their careers before 1950 appear in the top 10 is given by P (X = 6) = 10 6 p 6 (1 − p) 4 = 210 × 0.1793812 6 × (1 − 0.1793812) 4 = 0.0031728.
R statistical software was used as a calculator throughout the Statistical Evidence section. Similar calculations to this one are made to calculate all of the probabilities that appear in Tables 3 and 4. 
